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CALLING THEM AS HE SEES THEM: THE DISAPPEARANCE OF
ORIGINALISM IN JUSTICE THOMAS’S OPINIONS ON RACE
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN *
ABSTRACT
During his first two decades on the Court, Justice Clarence
Thomas has been associated with originalism and is often viewed
as its leading judicial proponent. Justice Thomas has linked
originalism with the effort to limit judicial discretion and to promote judicial impartiality. In cases dealing with many constitutional provisions, Justice Thomas has shown his commitment to
originalism by often writing solitary concurrences and dissents
advocating an originalist analysis of a problem. Yet in constitutional cases dealing with race, Justice Thomas routinely abandons originalism and embraces the sort of constitutional arguments based on morality or consequentialism that he often
discounts. These opinions in race cases are often powerful and
impassioned, just not originalist. Justice Thomas’s behavior in
these race cases indicates that he is less committed to originalism
than often suggested or than he claims. In these cases, he has often provided a distinctive, and personal, perspective to the Court.
In doing so, however, he departs from the originalism that he has
otherwise advocated as the route to judicial impartiality.
INTRODUCTION
During his first two decades on the Supreme Court, Justice Clarence
Thomas has established himself as its most outspoken originalist. In numerous opinions and nonjudicial utterances, Justice Thomas has propounded an approach to interpreting the Constitution which insists that its text be
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construed in accordance with some version of originalism. Originalism, according to Justice Thomas, is the legitimate way to understand the Constitution, the secret to protecting judicial impartiality, and the elixir to preventing judges from imposing their values on constitutional decisionmaking.
The commitment to originalism that is so conspicuous in so many of
Justice Thomas’s constitutional opinions is less evident when he writes
about race. In those cases, he makes few, if any, references to 1789 (or
1791) or 1868 to find constitutional meaning. Instead, time and again he
interprets the relevant constitutional language by emphasizing other aids,
including the sort of moral, consequentialist, and policy-oriented arguments
that trigger his criticism—even outrage—in other contexts. And he reaches
results that seem inconsistent with where originalism would lead.
The divergence in Justice Thomas’s approach in constitutional cases
dealing with race is perceptible and recurring. It has characterized his judicial behavior from the beginning of his tenure on the Court and has continued through the Court’s most recent terms. For instance, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 1 he again wrote a concurring opinion in a
constitutional case dealing with race but justified his conclusions on moral
and consequential, not originalist, arguments.
The disappearance of originalism from this body of Justice Thomas’s
opinions is noteworthy in view of his intense interest in, and strong beliefs
and feelings about, constitutional, historical, and policy issues relating to
race. Such issues are clearly not matters of indifference to Justice Thomas.
Far from it. He writes about these topics frequently when they come before
the Court and sometimes introduces considerations based on race in cases
ostensibly about something else. His opinions in these cases are passionate.
One might expect Justice Thomas to deploy originalism, the constitutional
theory he champions, to interpret the Constitution on issues that engage him
so deeply. He does not. In fact, the converse is true. Race cases are one of
the rare constitutional issues where his reliance on originalism largely vanishes.
Justice Thomas has not explained or even acknowledged the absence
of an originalist presentation from his jurisprudence in constitutional cases
dealing with race, and this silence is equally conspicuous. Although Justice
Thomas has participated in discussions of correct and incorrect modes of
constitutional interpretation and has written and spoken about constitutional
interpretation since joining the Court, he has not offered any published justification of why his judicial methodology in race cases differs so markedly
from his practice in many other areas of constitutional law.

1. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2428–32 (2013) (arguing that the “racial tinkering” of universities
through affirmative action policies does more to harm than to help minorities).
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It cannot be said that Justice Thomas’s failure to use originalism as his
interpretive compass in race cases is surprising in view of the consistency in
that particular omission during the more than two decades he has served on
the Court. But predictability of the pattern does not make it any less anomalous.
The disappearance of originalism in race cases raises questions regarding Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence. It might suggest that he is a less faithful originalist than he has professed or that he sometimes uses originalism
to reach desired results but abandons that methodology when it will not
generate a congenial outcome. In a sense, neither conclusion would necessarily separate Justice Thomas from many other jurists who treat originalism as one of a number of valid types of constitutional argument. Yet two
factors distinguish Justice Thomas’s behavior in this regard. First, those
other jurists subscribe to more pluralistic theories of constitutional adjudication. Unlike Justice Thomas, they do not claim that originalism is the only
valid path, and accordingly, their departures from it do not deviate from the
interpretive theories they espouse. Second, Justice Thomas’s failure even
to acknowledge the discrepancy between his professed theory and his performance in constitutional cases dealing with race suggests either that he is
oblivious to the pattern or does not believe himself compelled to explain it.
Justice Thomas’s tendency to jettison originalism in race cases also
raises questions about originalism. It might suggest that the methodology
of originalism simply cannot produce the outcomes in race cases some of its
proponents have claimed, both in justifying the results in Brown v. Board of
Education 2 and Bolling v. Sharpe 3 and in supporting opposition to race conscious decisionmaking in affirmative action cases. My purpose here is not
to investigate the merits of that question. Justice Thomas’s behavior itself
cannot prove that originalism is deficient in this regard, but the failure of
such a prominent and admired originalist to use that interpretive technique
in race cases is curious to say the least.
Although Justice Thomas does generally prefer some brand of
originalism, his behavior in constitutional cases dealing with race suggests
that such an orientation is not his ultimate jurisprudential commitment. If it
were, he would either draw from originalism extensively in writing on those
cases, as he often does elsewhere, or perhaps he would explain why the
originalist tools he uses in other contexts are not useful interpretive instruments in race cases. Instead, his opinions in race cases appear to draw
heavily from his deeply held beliefs and feelings about racial justice in2. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public education violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
3. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools in the District
of Columbia violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
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formed by his own experience. Yet just as conflicts emerge between his
professed methodology of originalism and his handling of constitutional
cases involving race, so too, do inconsistencies emerge in his handling of
high profile race cases. Ultimately, in race cases, whatever value Justice
Thomas brings to the Court comes not because he adheres to a rigorous or
consistent form of adjudication—he doesn’t—but because he speaks passionately based on a distinctive set of experiences and values. Far from being the impartial jurist Justice Thomas has celebrated as the model and with
which he has associated originalism, Justice Thomas’s discussions of race
draw heavily from lessons in his own life.
This Article begins by discussing Justice Thomas’s stated aspiration to
be an originalist justice and describes his performance generally in this respect. Part II shows how he abandons originalism in constitutional cases
dealing with race. Part III discusses in more depth his opinions in cases
discussing race issues to show his engagement in that area. Part IV draws
conclusions.
I. ORIGINALISM AND JUSTICE THOMAS
A. Justice Thomas’s Case for Originalism
Since joining the Court, Justice Thomas has pronounced impartiality
as “the very essence of judging and of being a judge.” 4 This vision informed his comments during his confirmation proceedings, where he expounded an uncompromising view of judicial neutrality. In nominating
him, President George H.W. Bush had said that he told Judge Thomas “that
he ought to do like the umpire: Call them as you see them.” 5 At his confirmation hearings, Judge Thomas declared that a judge had to “become accustomed to not having views, formed views on issues that may come before him or her. You become impartial or neutral.” 6 Whether interpreting a
statute or the Constitution, Judge Thomas said, the judicial role was limited;
and the judge’s role was “at no point to impose his or her will or his or her
opinion in that process, but, rather, to go to the traditional tools of constitutional interpretation or adjudication, as well as to statutory construction, but
not, again, to impose his or her own point of view or his or her predilections
4. Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996). See also CLARENCE
THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 238 (2007) (discussing the process that an impartial judge follows in each case in order to determine his or her ultimate ruling).
5. The President’s News Conference in Kennebunkport, Maine, 1991 PUB. PAPERS 801, 805
(July 1, 1991).
6. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings on Nomination of Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102d. Cong., Pt.
1, 134 (1991) [hereinafter, Thomas Hearings].
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or preconceptions.” 7 A judge should not be an activist or have an agenda 8
or “strong ideology” or “ideological views” but should “strip down, like a
runner” to relieve himself from such baggage. 9
In his opinions while on the Court and in his extrajudicial writings,
Justice Thomas has embraced originalism as the way to advance judicial
impartiality and to protect judicial opinions from reflecting the personal biases of particular jurists. 10 Justice Thomas provided his most developed
published statement of some of his ideas in a 1996 speech on “Judging” at
the University of Kansas School of Law. There he celebrated the importance of impartiality in judging, prescribed limiting judicial discretion as
a means to promote impartiality, and offered originalism as a methodology
to limit judicial discretion. Justice Thomas vigorously rejected the notion
that judges make law. 11 Instead, judges are to be “impartial referees.” 12 In
fact, a jurist “must attempt to exorcise himself or herself of the passions,
thoughts, and emotions that fill any frail human being. He must become
almost pure” in order to perform the judicial function.13 In order to render a
fair judgment, a judge must “push to one side” identifying characteristics
such as race or sex. 14 Just as a black referee would not be expected to favor
black participants in calling a sporting event, a black judge cannot favor the
“perceived interests” of black litigants.15 A jurist, especially a justice, must

7. Id. at 135; see also id. at 137 (stating that a judge’s personal views should not play a role
and that a judge should consider recusal if he or she is unable to be “impartial or objective”); id. at
180 (discussing the need for a judge to be impartial and to be perceived as such); id. at 183 (stating that judges must shed personal opinions and not express strong opinions to preserve impartiality); id. at 334 (stating that a judge should not read views into the Constitution).
8. Id. at 172.
9. Id. at 203; see also id. at 267 (claiming that a judge strives for “impartiality” and “strip[s]
down from . . . policy positions”).
10. See, e.g., Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 523 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“When faced with a clash of constitutional principle and a line of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the text, history, and structure of our founding document, we should not hesitate to
resolve the tension in favor of the Constitution’s original meaning.”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (declaring “[s]trict adherence” to text and tradition “is
essential if we are to fulfill our constitutionally assigned role of giving full effect to the mandate
of the Framers without infusing the constitutional fabric with our own political views.”); see also
Thomas, supra note 4, at 4–8 (celebrating importance of judicial impartiality and recommending
originalism as a means to limit judicial discretion and promote impartiality); A Conversation with
Justice Clarence Thomas, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 20 (2009) (“It’s what I’m trying to find from the
people who were there, or who were close to that . . . . Is it perfect? No it’s not. And some people like to call it originalism. But it keeps me from putting my personal views on it.”).
11. Thomas, supra note 4, at 2–5.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 5.
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adopt an adjudicatory methodology which will minimize judicial discretion
and promote judicial restraint.16
Justice Thomas offered originalism as the methodology central to his
vision of judging. According to Justice Thomas, judges cannot use ambiguous constitutional language to justify imposing “our modern theories and
preconceptions upon the Constitution.” 17 Instead, in constitutional cases
courts should search for the “original understanding” of constitutional language, the meaning of which is not clear. 18 Moreover, under originalism
the Constitution means what it was understood to mean by the delegates at
the Philadelphia and the ratifying conventions. 19 Justice Thomas also justified originalism as implied by the written nature of the Constitution.20 The
decision to adopt a written Constitution rejected a vision of one whose
meaning evolved or changed.
Five years after his Kansas lecture, Justice Thomas sounded very similar themes in his Francis Boyer Lecture to the American Enterprise Institute. Judges must be “impartial referees,” he proclaimed. 21 They must push
to the side their race, gender, and religion and “must attempt to keep at bay
those passions, interests, and emotions that beset every frail human being.” 22 Although the Constitution was written “in broad, sometimes ambiguous terms,” it lent itself to “correct” answers which could be discovered if
judges adopted “principles of interpretation and methods of analysis that
reduce judicial discretion.” 23 He said constitutional interpretation “should
seek the original understanding” if the text’s meaning is not clear. 24 Constitutional meaning was determined by “the understanding” of the drafters and
ratifiers. 25
More recently, in a lecture to the Manhattan Institute, Justice Thomas
again invoked originalism as a means to preserve judicial impartiality. He
declared that constitutional interpreters could either try to discern the Framers’ intent “or make it up” 26 and that interpretive methods that are not based
on the Framers’ original intent “have no more basis in the Constitution than
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id.
21. Clarence Thomas, Be Not Afraid, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Feb. 13, 2001),
http://www.aei.org/publication/be-not-afraid/.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Clarence Thomas, How to Read the Constitution, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2008),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122445985683948619.html (reprinting excerpts from Justice
Thomas’s Wriston Lecture to the Manhattan Institute).
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the latest football scores.” 27 Justice Thomas conceded that although even
conscientious efforts to apply the Framers’ original intent were flawed,
originalism at least was “legitimate” and “impartial.”28
B. Justice Thomas as Constitutional Originalist
Justice Thomas’s judicial performance has also evidenced a commitment to some form of originalism in interpreting the Constitution. To be
sure, only a fraction of the opinions Justice Thomas writes address constitutional matters. He writes relatively few majority opinions in constitutional
cases 29 and, when he does, he often relies heavily on judicial precedent rather than on originalist reasoning, 30 an unsurprising course in view of the
institutional responsibility to write for a group most of whose members do
not share his professed commitment to originalism.
Concurrences and dissents afford a justice a better opportunity to establish and express an independent judicial voice, and Justice Thomas has
made frequent use of such discretionary opinions in constitutional cases to
take issue with non-originalist methodologies and to celebrate originalism
and apply arguments associated with it. In an early opinion, he suggested
that recourse to “‘evolving standards of decency,’” a tool of living constitutionalists, 31 was illegitimate because it transformed the role of the federal
judiciary in an unintended way. 32 On another occasion, he caricatured “the
pervasive view that the Federal Constitution must address all ills in our society.” 33 A 1999 dissenting opinion called for overruling a decision which
“constitutionalizes a policy choice that a majority of the Court found desirable at the time. . . . This sort of undertaking is not an exercise in constitutional interpretation but an act of judicial willfulness that has no logical
stopping point.” 34 More recently, he chastised the majority for following its
own sense of morality rather than original understanding in order to shape
future societal consensus. 35 Justice Thomas’s enthusiasm for originalism
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of Amateur History, in REHNQUIST
JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 73–74 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003).
30. But see Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013) (relying in part on the
original meaning of the Sixth Amendment in holding that a defendant has the right to a jury trial
regarding any fact that increases the range of possible penalties).
31. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72, 579 (2003) (relying on evolving
standards to strike down Texas law outlawing same sex sodomy).
32. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859–60 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
33. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
34. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 343 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
35. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2482 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing for
original understanding in construing Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of Eighth Amendment); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 97, 101 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting
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was such that in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission 36 he found that
even a long-standing (“a century of practice”) and widespread (“by almost
all of the States”) practice 37 must yield to originalism, even when Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist thought the original meaning too obscure to be recalled38 and when “[t]he historical record is not as complete or
as full as I would desire.” 39
Justice Thomas’s confirmation testimony might have encouraged the
expectation that such ongoing history and tradition of the sort he encountered in McIntyre would help shape constitutional meaning. Although he
had indicated that original intent was important, 40 he signaled that it would
not constitute a trump card in his manner of constitutional adjudication.
Constitutional interpretation should understand “what our Founders believed” but also “our history and our tradition, not just what their beliefs
were when they drafted the document.” 41 In interpreting the word “liberty,”
he said an “important point is what did the Framers think they were doing,”
but that question presented only part of the inquiry since “[t]he world didn’t
stop with the Framers. The concept of liberty wasn’t self-defining at that
point.” 42 Accordingly “it is important . . . that you then look at the rest of
the history and tradition of our country.” 43
Yet rather than joining Justice Stevens’s majority opinion striking
down Ohio’s ban on distributing anonymous campaign literature, Justice
Thomas wrote a thirteen page concurring opinion reaching the same result
as the Court but based on his assessment of the “original understanding” of
right of Court to decide Eighth Amendment issues based on evolving or national consensus or
moral conceptions).
36. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
37. Id. at 370 (Thomas, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 371–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40. Thomas Hearings, supra note 6, at 112; id. at 168 (referring to natural law as relevant in
understanding the Framers’ views and values); id. at 170–71 (describing natural law as a way to
understanding the Framers’ views, not as a theory of adjudication); id. at 179 (limiting the use of
natural law to understanding what the Framers meant and were trying to do); id. at 189 (limiting
the use of natural law to understanding the intent of the drafters of the Civil War Amendments);
id. at 237–38 (discussing recourse to beliefs of the Founders to understand liberty and other constitutional concepts); id. at 274, 275–77; id. at 303 (advocating looking at the Framers’ intent); id.
at 342 (discussing the importance of looking at the Framers’ intent).
41. Id. at 193.
42. Id. at 269–70.
43. Id. at 270; see also id. at 273 (“[H]ow do we determine how our country has advanced
and grown . . . ? It is an amorphous process at times, but it is an important process.”); id. at 274
(arguing that meaning of liberty does not stop at time of framing of Constitution but “evolves with
the country, it moves with our history and our tradition.”); id. (arguing that Framers used “liberty”
because it was a “broad concept” that “evolves over time” and that in interpreting it courts have
accordingly looked to the “ideals” and “values” “that we share as a culture” which have “evolved
over time” in “that specific provision”).
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the First Amendment. 44 Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s reasoning
“because it deviates from our settled approach to interpreting the Constitution and because it superimposes its modern theories concerning expression
upon the constitutional text.” 45 The longstanding practice of anonymous
publication “should be irrelevant to our analysis, because it sheds no light
on what the phrases ‘free speech’ or ‘free press’ meant to the people who
drafted and ratified the First Amendment.” 46 That “certain types of expression have ‘value’ today has little significance; what is important is whether
the Framers in 1791 believed anonymous speech sufficiently valuable to
deserve the protection of the Bill of Rights.” 47
Justice Thomas claimed, “When interpreting other provisions of the
Constitution, this Court has believed itself bound by the text of the Constitution and by the intent of those who drafted and ratified it.”48 The same
commitment to original meaning should govern the First Amendment “for
‘[t]he Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not
alter. That which it meant when adopted, it means now.’” 49 Justice Thomas has reiterated this static approach to constitutional meaning on other occasions. 50
As his McIntyre concurrence signaled, Justice Thomas has often written discretionary opinions to apply some form of originalism in constitutional cases. One week after he issued his thirteen page McIntyre concurrence, he wrote a nineteen page concurrence to advocate use of original
understanding to redefine the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence in
United States v. Lopez. 51 Although Justice Thomas joined the Court’s majority opinion that, for the first time in nearly sixty years, struck down an
act of Congress as beyond its power under the Commerce Clause, he wrote
separately to advocate a return to original understanding in future Com-

44. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358–59 (rejecting the Court’s “methodology” focusing on the
“honorable tradition” and “value” of anonymous speech to focus on whether original the understanding of “freedom of speech” included anonymous speech).
45. Id. at 370.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 359 (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)).
50. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that as a written document, the Constitution’s meaning does not change); Utah v.
Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 491 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“We
should be guided, therefore, by the Census Clause’s original meaning, for [t]he Constitution is a
written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted, it
means now.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause will not change in twenty-five years).
51. 514 U.S. 549, 584–602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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merce Clause cases. 52 Specifically, Justice Thomas argued that the majority’s “substantial effects” test was inconsistent with the text and history of
the Constitution. Justice Thomas indicated a preference for a jurisprudence
based on original understanding53 but did not reject all roles for precedent 54
since others in the Lopez majority thought it “too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years.” 55 Justice Thomas’s
emphasis on original understanding differed markedly not only from that of
the other four dissenters but also from Justice Kennedy’s precedent-focused
concurrence, which Justice O’Connor joined, and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
majority opinion for five justices including Justice Thomas. Significantly,
no other justice joined Justice Thomas’s opinion.
A decade later, Justice Thomas again advanced an originalist approach
to the Commerce Clause in Gonzales v. Raich. 56 He construed “commerce”
in light of what that term meant “at the time of the founding” based on his
reading of “founding-era dictionaries, Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention, The Federalist Papers, and the ratification debates.” 57
He was interested in what “commerce” meant “not simply to those involved
52. Id. at 584 (“I write separately to observe that our case law has drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. In a future case, we ought to temper our Commerce
Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of our more recent case law and is more
faithful to the original understanding of that Clause.”).
53. Id. at 601 n.8 (“Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of
the past 60 years.”); see also id. at 585 (“My goal is simply to show how far we have departed
from the original understanding . . . .”); id. (“At the time the original Constitution was ratified,
‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”); id. at 586 (“In fact, when Federalists and Anti-Federalists discussed the Commerce Clause
during the ratification period, they often used trade (in its selling/bartering sense) and commerce
interchangeably.”); id. (“As one would expect, the term ‘commerce’ was used in contradistinction
to productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture.”); id. at 590 (“The exchanges during the ratification campaign reveal the relatively limited reach of the Commerce Clause and of
federal power generally. The Founding Fathers confirmed that most areas of life (even many matters that would have substantial effects on commerce) would remain outside the reach of the Federal Government. Such affairs would continue to be under the exclusive control of the States.”);
id. at 590–91 (“Early Americans understood that commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture, while
distinct activities, were intimately related and dependent on each other—that each ‘substantially
affected’ the others . . . . Yet, despite being well aware that agriculture, manufacturing, and other
matters substantially affected commerce, the founding generation did not cede authority over all
these activities to Congress.”).
54. See, e.g., id. at 585 (“In an appropriate case, I believe that we must further reconsider our
‘substantial effects’ test with an eye toward constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”); id. at 601 (“This extended discussion of the original understanding and our first century
and a half of case law does not necessarily require a wholesale abandonment of our more recent
opinions.”).
55. Id. at 601 n.8.
56. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
57. Id. at 58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

2014]

CALLING THEM AS HE SEES THEM

89

in the drafting and ratification processes, but also to the general public.”58
He has also used originalist methodologies to analyze a range of issues in
other cases dealing with constitutional structure.59
Justice Thomas does not use originalism only in cases interpreting the
structural provisions of the Constitution. He has frequently deployed
originalism to interpret some of the Constitution’s open-ended language regarding individual rights. In Morse v. Frederick,60 Justice Thomas joined
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion but wrote a concurrence to argue
that the First Amendment was not originally understood to protect student
speech in public schools. Justice Thomas reached that conclusion based on
the behavior of contemporary political actors. “If students in public schools
were originally understood as having free-speech rights, one would have
expected 19th-century public schools to have respected those rights and
courts to have enforced them. They did not.”61
Justice Thomas has gone out of his way to embrace various forms of
originalism in other cases involving a range of rights, including interpreting
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause,62 the First Amendment’s Free
58. Id. at 59; id. at 70 (“The interconnectedness of economic activity is not a modern phenomenon unfamiliar to the Framers.”); id. (“the Framers understood what the majority does not
appear to fully appreciate”); see also American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct.
2096, 2105–06 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (concurring separately in unanimous opinion to
argue that federal statute regulating intrastate commerce is unconstitutional); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2263–64 (2013)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (invoking original intent to interpret the Voter Qualifications Clause of
the Constitution); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2567–70 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (using original understanding to argue that the Indian Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to regulate Indian child custody proceedings); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct.
at 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “substantial effects” test is inconsistent
with the original understanding of the Commerce Clause); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580
(2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (invoking the Framers’ intent regarding presidential power and
national security); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 432, 491 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (using originalism to interpret the Census Clause); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine should return to original understanding); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 621–24 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (applying various forms of originalism to the Import-Export Clause); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 871–77
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (using originalism to construe the Tenth Amendment and to derive
basic principles of federalism).
60. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
61. Id. at 411 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also id. at 418–19 (“As originally understood, the
Constitution does not afford students a right to free speech in public schools.”).
62. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–93 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling for
return to original meaning of “Establishment Clause”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 856–57 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Even if Madison believed
that the principle of nonestablishment of religion precluded government financial support for religion per se (in the sense of government benefits specifically targeting religion), there is no indication that at the time of the framing he took the dissent’s extreme view that the government must
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Speech Clause, 63 the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, 64 the Search and
Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment, 65 the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 66 the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 67 the
Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 68 the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 69 the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 70 the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
discriminate against religious adherents by excluding them from more generally available financial subsidies.”); id. at 863 (“The dissent identifies no evidence that the Framers intended to disable religious entities from participating on neutral terms in evenhanded government programs.
The evidence that does exist points in the opposite direction and provides ample support for today’s decision.”).
63. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2752 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the original understanding of the Free Speech Clause does not authorize a party to
speak to a minor without the permission of a parent); Morse, 551 U.S. at 411, 418–19 (Thomas J.,
concurring) (arguing that the original understanding of the First Amendment did not protect student speech in public schools); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358–59 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the First Amendment precludes a state from prohibiting the
distribution of anonymous political materials).
64. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2501–02 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing doubt that lawsuits are within the Petition Clause under its original meaning).
65. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (applying the common law “knock and
announce” requirement to police).
66. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision is simply the latest in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a
virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its original meaning. In my view, the Public Use
Clause, originally understood, is a meaningful limit on the government’s eminent domain power.”); id. at 508 (“This would contradict a bedrock principle well established by the time of the
founding: that all takings required the payment of compensation.”); id. at 508–09 (citing early dictionaries and eminent domain practice to identify meaning of the term “use”); id. at 514 (criticizing Court for adopting “its modern reading blindly, with little discussion of the Clause’s history
and original meaning”); id. at 521 (“I would revisit our Public Use Clause cases and consider returning to the original meaning of the Public Use Clause . . . .”).
67. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Fifth Amendment does not prohibit adverse comment on a criminal defendant’s pre-custodial silence because at “founding, English and American courts strongly encouraged defendants to give
unsworn statements and drew adverse inferences when they failed to do so”).
68. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 218 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2260–64 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that original understanding limits the Confrontation Clause to formalized testimonial materials); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (advancing
originalist argument to limit the scope of the Confrontation Clause); Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 835–36 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
70. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2484 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that mandatory life sentence without parole does not violate original understanding); Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing for an application of original
understanding in interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); Baze v Rees, 553 U.S.
35, 94–95, 97, 99, 107 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing contemporary dictionaries, Framers’ intent, and contemporary practice); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (using eighteenth-century dictionaries to define punishment as deriving from judicial
sentence, not relating to conditions of confinement); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38
(1993); see id. at 38 (“At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word ‘punishment’ re-
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the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 72 and hints at it in other contexts.73
In these cases, Justice Thomas does not simply give lip service to
originalism. On the contrary, he typically explores originalist underpinnings of issues at some length. For instance, in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 74 Justice Thomas was the only dissenter in an 8-1 decision holding that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the initial appearance of
an arrested individual for a determination of probable cause and bail. The
Court’s decision was not supported, Justice Thomas wrote, by “the original
meaning of the Sixth Amendment or any reasonable interpretation of our
precedents.” 75 Although Justice Thomas seemingly relied on precedent as
well as originalism, the latter mode of argument clearly drove his analysis.
The key question, Justice Thomas suggested, was what the constitutional
phrase “criminal prosecutions” “meant when the Sixth Amendment was
adopted” and what it “would have been understood to entail by those who
adopted the Sixth Amendment.” 76 Blackstone was the starting point for
Justice Thomas’s analysis and the next six paragraphs of his dissent digested Blackstone’s usage, a discussion Justice Thomas reinforced by citing an
early version of Noah Webster’s dictionary. Justice Thomas cited nineteenth century cases consistent with his view that “criminal prosecutio[n]”
as used in the Sixth Amendment “refers to the commencement of a criminal
suit by filing formal charges in a court with jurisdiction to try and punish
the defendant.” 77 The “original meaning” of the Sixth Amendment accordingly cut “decisively” against the Court’s conclusion. 78

ferred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime . . . . Nor, as far as I know, is there
any historical evidence indicating that the [F]ramers and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment had
anything other than this common understanding of ‘punishment’ in mind.”).
71. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521 (1999) (“[T]he majority attributes a meaning to the Privileges or Immunities Clause that likely was unintended when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted and ratified.”). Justice Thomas said he “would look to history to ascertain the original
meaning of the Clause.” Id. at 522. He stated that “I would be open to reevaluating its meaning in
an appropriate case. Before invoking the Clause, however, we should endeavor to understand
what the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it meant.” Id. at 528.
72. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
original understanding did not afford Due Process Clause right to appointed counsel for indigent
defendant facing incarceration in civil contempt proceeding).
73. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (“I write separately to note that neither party has argued that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and that the
original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated
rights under that constitutional provision.”).
74. 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
75. Id. at 218 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 219.
77. Id. at 223.
78. Id. at 224.
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Several markers confirm the strength of Justice Thomas’s apparent
commitment to originalism in many of these cases. He has been willing to
stake out an originalist position even when doing so leaves him filing a
concurrence or dissent that no other justice joins, as he has on numerous
occasions. 79 Justice Thomas’s adherence to originalism is sufficiently zealous that at times he is willing to overturn precedents that others view as too
entrenched to touch. In Mitchell v. United States, 80 for instance, Justice
Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent which resisted extending Griffin v.
California, 81 a Warren Court decision that precluded a judge or prosecutor
from commenting about a defendant’s failure to testify in a criminal case.
Whereas Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor
characterized Griffin as “a wrong turn” based largely on its inconsistency
with originalism, 82 they concluded that was “not cause enough to overrule
it.” 83 Justice Thomas wrote a separate and solitary dissent to announce that
he “would be willing to reconsider Griffin” in an appropriate case largely
on originalist grounds. 84 He has also argued for abandoning the Court’s
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, which has evolved over the last two
centuries, and for replacing it with reliance on the Import-Export Clause
based on originalist argument. 85
This willingness to stand alone in asserting originalist arguments and
in overturning doctrine others accept has been an enduring characteristic of
Justice Thomas’s service on the Court. In 2007, he wrote a solitary concurrence 86 to call on the Court to overturn Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District 87 on originalist grounds. In Haywood v.
Drown, 88 he argued, based on Framers’ intent, that state courts were not obligated to hear federal claims, 89 a position sufficiently radical that Chief
79. See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2261 (2013)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 218 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Gonzales v Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
80. 526 U.S. 314, 331 (1999).
81. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
82. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 332–36.
83. Id. at 336. But see Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 42 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“Stare decisis may call for hesitation in overruling a dubious precedent, but it does not demand
that such a precedent be expanded to its outer limits.”).
84. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 341, 343 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
85. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
86. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
87. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
88. 556 U.S. 729 (2009).
89. Id. at 742–68 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito declined to join that portion of
Justice Thomas’s dissent. 90 More recently, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 91 Justice Thomas argued for a return to the “original meaning” of the
Fourteenth Amendment that would incorporate certain rights against the
states via the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than through the Due
Process Clause. 92 Justice Thomas acknowledged, but was not deterred by,
the “volume of precedents” resting on the Due Process Clause.93 By contrast, Justice Alito and the three other justices who also believed that the
Second Amendment applied to the states, declined to depart from the
Slaughter-House Cases 94 and refused to join Justice Thomas’s opinion. In
Berghuis v. Smith, Justice Thomas wrote a two paragraph concurrence to
alert potential litigants that he would be willing to reconsider the cases
guaranteeing defendants in criminal cases a jury that represents “a fair cross
section of the community” on the grounds that in 1791 the Sixth Amendment conferred no such protection since when the amendment was ratified,
many states excluded various classes of people from that activity. 95 Every
other justice joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court without elaboration.
Justice Thomas’s devotion to originalism has caused some conservative academics to regard some of his positions as unduly activist.96 Even
Justice Scalia has reportedly distinguished his own interpretive methodology from that of Justice Thomas in terms that suggest some reservation regarding his colleague’s approach. Justice Scalia reportedly said: “I am an
originalist, but I am not a nut.” 97
Justice Thomas has championed originalism but has not followed a
consistent approach in applying it in his written opinions. 98 At times, Jus-

90. Id. at 742.
91. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
92. Id. at 3062, 3086 (Thomas, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 3062–63.
94. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
95. 559 U.S. 314, 334 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
96. See, e.g., Ernest Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1139, 1166–67 (2002) (criticizing Justice Thomas’s Commerce Clause opinions as activist).
Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 271, 273 (2005) (arguing for reliance on precedent, rather than originalism, to
promote judicial restraint).
97. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 120
(Anchor reprint 2008) (2007).
98. Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning of the Constitution Matters to Justice
Thomas?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 494, 511, 514 (2009). But see RALPH A. ROSSUM,
UNDERSTANDING CLARENCE THOMAS: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTORATION
13 (2014) (arguing that Justice Thomas incorporates different originalist methodologies “into his
own distinctive original general meaning approach”)
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tice Thomas has emphasized the Framers’ original intent, 99 on other occasions, the Constitution’s original understanding based on how constitutional
language was interpreted when adopted, 100 and sometimes the Constitution’s original objective meaning when adopted rather than what the Framers intended or contemporary audiences understood. 101 Sometimes, he has
mixed approaches. 102 Although one perceptive scholar sees some virtue in
99. See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2264 (2013) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (discussing the Framers’ intent regarding the Voter Qualifications Clause); United
States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859–60 (1996) (relying in part on the intent of the
Framers in interpreting the Export Clause); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 779 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (referring to what the Framers did and “sought”); Wilson v. Arkansas,
514 U.S. 927, 931, 934 (1995) (looking to the Framers’ intent to determine the meaning of “reasonable” in the Fourth Amendment); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358–59, 363 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (using text and the original intent of the
drafters to interpret the Confrontation Clause).
100. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2482 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority opinion as inconsistent with the original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (looking to the beliefs of the founding generation to interpret the First Amendment);
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (looking to original
understanding to interpret the application of the First Amendment to public schools); Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (applying precedent because parties
had not argued “that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and that the original
understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights
under that constitutional provision”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing “substantial effects” test as inconsistent with “original understanding”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling for an
interpretation of the Commerce Clause based on “original understanding”); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358–59, 370 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling for determining whether “freedom of speech” as “originally understood” protected anonymous political
leafleting).
101. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2501 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(applying the original meaning of the Petition Clause); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct.
3020, 3058 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (seeking to discern how ordinary citizens at the time
of ratification would have interpreted the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause); Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 218 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (using original meaning to determine the meaning of “criminal prosecution” in the Sixth Amendment); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 518 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the decision reinstates
original meaning of Fifth and Sixth Amendments); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49–50
(2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the original meaning of “witness” in the SelfIncrimination Clause included all who gave evidence not just those who testified); Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (using late-eighteenth-century dictionaries to define “punishment”); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38, 40 (1993) (using late-eighteenth-century dictionaries and other sources to discover “original meaning” of “punishment” when the Eighth Amendment was ratified).
102. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580 (2011) (discussing ratification-era practices to determine meaning); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 161–62 (2010) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (relying on evidence of intent of drafters and ratifiers and invoking intent and understanding); Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 532 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (articulating original meaning as criteria in a First Amendment case but
arguably applying original understanding); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 621–37 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring alternatively to original un-
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Justice Thomas’s pluralistic approach to originalism since it allows him to
access more historical information, please a wider body of originalist academics, and defer committing to one originalist approach,103 others point
out that less fully specified originalist theories lend themselves to ideological wobbling. 104 In some respects, this flexibility does not distinguish the
originalist from other constitutional interpreters who use various modes of
constitutional argument to reach or justify results. Yet the originalist can
take little comfort from a conclusion that he or she is no different from other interpreters. For the originalist claim of interpretive superiority rests
largely on the assertion that originalism imposes objective constraints that
align it with the rule of law. Nonetheless, Justice Thomas’s many admirers
praise what they see as his principled commitment to originalism. 105
II. RACE AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ORIGINALISM
Justice Thomas’s approach to constitutional interpretation is quite different in cases dealing with race. Here, as elsewhere, Justice Thomas generally reaches conservative conclusions. He has repeatedly articulated a
color-blind Constitution and has argued that a uniform standard of strict
scrutiny applies whenever a government entity uses a racial classification,

derstanding, original usage, original meaning, and original intent in discussing Import-Export
Clause); Helling, 509 U.S. at 38 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (using late-eighteenth-century dictionaries and other sources to discover meaning of “punishment” when Eighth Amendment was ratified
but also focusing on what Framers and ratifiers had “in mind”).
103. Maggs, supra note 98, at 515–16.
104. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They
Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 16 (2011) (arguing that versions of originalism that are not well specified are manipulable to achieve conservative results);
William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV.
1217, 1244 (2002) (“Originalism is a doctrine of convenience and, even then, not consistently applied.”).
105. See, e.g., Richard Albert, The Next Constitutional Revolution, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
707, 729, 735 (2011) (praising Justice Thomas for his principled commitment to originalism);
Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 7, 15 (2006); Edwin Meese III, The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L.
REV. 349, 349 (2000) (praising Thomas for fidelity to the Constitution and originalism); Timothy
Sandefur, Clarence Thomas’s Jurisprudence Unexplained, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 535, 553
(2009) (praising Justice Thomas as a “strong and consistent” originalist); Lee J. Strang, The Most
Faithful Originalist?: Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 873, 876–77 (2011) (praising Justice Thomas for the consistency and purity of his
originalism); see also Maggs, supra note 98, at 510, 516 (describing Justice Thomas as originalist
but noting that his methodology uses a confluence of original intent, understanding, and meaning);
John Yoo, Twenty Years of Justice Thomas, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204485304576642963032597504 (calling
Justice Thomas the original Constitution’s “greatest defender”); John Yoo, The Real Clarence
Thomas, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB119189308788652936 (calling Justice Thomas “the justice most committed” to the Framers’ intent).
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whether to burden or benefit a racial minority. 106 Yet he reaches and justifies these results without apparent reliance on originalism.
The characteristics that for two decades have defined so many of Justice Thomas’s discretionary writings in other constitutional cases disappear
in his concurrences or dissents in constitutional cases dealing with race. In
these opinions, Justice Thomas does not say he is following the original intent, understanding, or meaning of the Constitution. He does not refer to
eighteenth or nineteenth century dictionaries or treatises to define terms.
He does not examine the debates or writings of the relevant Framers or ratifiers to fathom their intent or understandings regarding those concepts. He
does not explore the practices or expectations of the contemporaneous generations to try to capture what they meant or thought. These originalist
tools, which he has favored for more than two decades in other constitutional cases, are largely absent from his interpretive toolkit in constitutional
cases dealing with race.
Justice Thomas’s opinions on race either are bereft of originalist argument or contain only the most passing originalist references when discussing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment—the two constitutional provisions those cases chiefly implicate. Instead, in these cases, Justice Thomas
emphasizes arguments based on precedent, as well as consequential and
moral reasoning.
A review of five significant constitutional cases dealing with race illustrates these points. In each case, Justice Thomas wrote a concurring or
dissenting opinion. As such, he was not discharging an institutional responsibility to present a consensus view. The decision to write was discretionary and signaled his desire to address the topic individually rather than rely
on a colleague’s exposition. In four of the five cases, no other justice
joined Justice Thomas’s opinion; although Justice Scalia joined most of
Justice Thomas’s opinion in the fifth case, Grutter v. Bollinger, 107 it, too,
seemed to reflect Justice Thomas’s unaltered voice. Thus, the views and
approach in these opinions can fairly be attributed to Justice Thomas alone.
Additionally, in four of the five cases, Justice Thomas wrote lengthy opinions in which he necessarily invested a substantial amount of time and had
plenty of space to develop his approach. Excluding his two page concurrence in Adarand v. Pena, 108 these opinions averaged almost twenty-seven
pages. Each interpreted the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment’s explicit or
implicit equal protection guarantee, yet notwithstanding the length of the
106. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1000 (1996) (Thomas, J. concurring) (“Strict scrutiny applies to all governmental classifications based on race . . . .”).
107. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
108. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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opinions, Justice Thomas offered no elaborated originalist presentation.
These opinions relied instead on other modes of constitutional argument.
Although the principal issue before the Court in Missouri v. Jenkins 109
was whether the Court could use the interdistrict remedy of magnet schools
to address intradistrict violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Justice
Thomas used his concurrence to launch a more broad-based discussion of
the Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence in the public school context. 110 Justice Thomas’s lengthy concurring opinion recast Brown v. Board
of Education 111 and argued that lower federal courts had exceeded their equitable powers. He asserted that Brown “did not need to rely upon any psychological or social-science research in order to announce the simple, yet
fundamental, truth that the government cannot discriminate among its citizens on the basis of race,” a conclusion he supported with a simple citation:
“See McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L.
Rev. 947 (1995).” 112
Justice Thomas’s terse reference to Professor McConnell’s controversial 113 originalist defense of Brown hardly qualifies as much of an originalist argument. Justice Thomas never discussed any of the evidence regarding the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause but simply asserted
that at the “heart” of Brown’s “interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
lies the principle that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, and
not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.” 114 Justice Thomas
never specifically said he was justifying Brown on originalist grounds. In
his article, Professor McConnell admitted that his attempt to harmonize
Brown and originalism represented a dramatic break from an overwhelming
contrary consensus view shared by scholars from across the ideological and
methodological spectrum, ranging from Ronald Dworkin, Lawrence Tribe,
and many others on the left, to Raoul Berger, Alexander Bickel, and Robert
Bork on the right. 115 Nonetheless, Justice Thomas did not discuss, or even
mention, a single work that represented the orthodox thesis Professor
McConnell’s argument challenged.
109. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
110. Id. at 120–21 (Thomas, J., concurring).
111. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120 (Thomas, J., concurring).
113. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1883 (1995) (criticizing McConnell’s argument as failing to justify the result in Brown on an originalist basis); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism
and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT.
223, 223 (1996) (arguing that McConnell fails to show school desegregation is consistent with
original intent or understanding).
114. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120–21 (Thomas, J., concurring).
115. Michael J. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947, 950–52 (1995).
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Furthermore, it is unclear how much Professor McConnell’s article
actually helped Justice Thomas reach his conclusion. Justice Thomas’s
opinion was issued on June 12, 1995, the case having been argued on January 11, 1995. Professor McConnell’s article appeared in the May 1995 volume of the Virginia Law Review. Unless Justice Thomas had access to an
early draft, the article could hardly have shaped Justice Thomas’s thinking.
More likely, the citation was a late addition to his concurrence to support a
conclusion already reached, which is consistent with Justice Thomas’s failure to discuss any of the evidence Professor McConnell provided.
Whereas Justice Thomas’s discussion of the Equal Protection Clause
relied primarily on precedent, along with moral and consequentialist arguments, 116 in discussing the separate and more general point that federal
courts had exceeded their equity powers 117 Justice Thomas presented a
lengthy originalist argument replete with citations to Blackstone, Thomas
Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and Anti-Federalist writings. 118 “Such extravagant uses of judicial power are at odds with the history and tradition of
the equity power and the Framers’ design,” Justice Thomas opined. “The
available historical records suggest that the Framers did not intend federal
equitable remedies to reach as broadly as we have permitted.” 119 Justice
Thomas was an originalist in Jenkins when discussing Article III of the
Constitution but not when regarding the Equal Protection Clause.
That same day, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, Inc., 120 Justice
Thomas penned a short concurrence in which he equated race-based affirmative action with Jim Crow laws. He argued that laws designed to subjugate a race are morally and constitutionally equivalent to “those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of
equality.” 121 Justice Thomas wrote that “the paternalism that appears to lie
at the heart of this [affirmative action] program is at war with the principle
of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution.”122 In sup-

116. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“It never ceases to amaze me that
the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior.”);
id. at 121–122 (“Given that desegregation has not produced the predicted leaps forward in black
educational achievement, there is no reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when
surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an integrated environment.”).
117. U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”).
118. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 126–31 (Thomas, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 126.
120. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
121. Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
122. Id.; see also id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing premise underlying dissents of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg that “there is a racial paternalism exception to the principle of equal
protection”).
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port, he cited only the Declaration of Independence and its proposition that
“[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” 123 Justice
Thomas cited the Declaration but did not argue that it provided the original
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Nor did he explain why the original
meaning of the Fifth Amendment prohibited racial classifications, especially those used to help a disadvantaged minority. Instead, most of his opinion
attacked such programs as immoral and productive of bad consequences. 124
Those two cases provided Justice Thomas with opportunities to present originalist arguments in cases dealing with school desegregation and
affirmative action. Both majority opinions relied heavily on precedent.
Both decisions presented Justice Thomas with an occasion to demonstrate
that originalism could provide a sturdier foundation for that result. He let
that opportunity pass.
His failure to use originalism to discuss the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses in these two cases becomes more curious in the context of
his work on other constitutional matters that term. Less than two months
earlier, he wrote concurrences to present originalist interpretations of the
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause in McIntyre and of the Commerce
Clause in Lopez rather than rest conclusions on the non-originalist modes of
constitutional interpretation in the majority opinions. In those two cases,
Justice Thomas thought it important to justify outcomes with extensive citations to originalist sources rather than rely on a colleague’s opinion reaching the same result based on precedent. But not in Jenkins or Adarand.
Less than one month earlier he had presented originalist interpretations of
the Qualifications Clause and the Tenth Amendment in his dissent in United
States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton 125 and of the Fourth Amendment’s
Search and Seizure Clause. 126 Less than three weeks after Jenkins and
Adarand came down, he made originalist arguments in interpreting the Establishment Clause in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia. 127 Justice Thomas used originalist arguments in these five constitutional cases handed down during spring 1995, just not when he addressed
race.

123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But see John Eastman, Reflections on Justice
Thomas’s Twenty Years on the Bench, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 691, 704 (2011) (describing
Justice Thomas’s citation to the Declaration of Independence as “[e]nough said”).
124. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
125. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
126. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
127. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Eight years after Jenkins-Adarand, Justice Thomas failed to base his
opinion on originalist argument in Grutter v. Bollinger 128 where a fivejustice majority upheld the use of race conscious decisionmaking in admissions at the University of Michigan Law School. Justice Thomas joined
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s principal dissent as well as Justice Scalia’s brief
opinion but also contributed his own twenty-nine page opinion. Justice
Thomas’s opinion was more than three times longer than Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s principal dissent that spoke for four justices. It occupied
roughly sixty percent of the space the four dissents used. Notwithstanding
its length, the opinion lacked any originalist argument, unless the reference
in the very last paragraph to “the principle of equality embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection Clause”129 is deemed to
be such. The absence of any significant originalist discussion is perhaps
more noteworthy because Justice Thomas implicitly envisioned the Constitution as a static document, whose meaning did not change over time, 130
thereby inviting an originalist justification. Justice Thomas discussed precedent and made generous use of consequentialist and moral argument, 131
and used such arguments to support his assertion that the Constitution mandates an anti-classification interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, 132
a conclusion the opinion reiterated frequently. 133 Much of his opinion attacked, on consequentialist grounds, the diversity interest Michigan offered—and the Court accepted—for the race conscious admissions pro128. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
129. Id. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 351 (“I believe that the Law School’s current use of race violates the Equal Protection Clause and that the Constitution means the same thing today as it will in 300 months.”).
131. See, e.g., id. at 349 (quoting Frederick Douglass: “What I ask for the negro is not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice. The American people have always been anxious
to know what they shall do with us . . . . I have had but one answer from the beginning. Do nothing with us! Your doing with us has already played the mischief with us. Do nothing with us!”);
id. at 350 (“Like Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without
the meddling of university administrators.”).
132. Id. at 353–54 (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because
those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because
every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all. ‘Purchased at the price of immeasurable human
suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our Nation’s understanding that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the individual and our society.’” (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U. S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))).
133. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“What
the Equal Protection Clause does prohibit are classifications made on the basis of race.”); id. at
371 (“clearly the majority still cannot commit to the principle that racial classifications are per se
harmful and that almost no amount of benefit in the eye of the beholder can justify such classifications.”); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would
hold that a State’s use of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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gram. Such programs harmed, rather than helped, African-Americans, in
part by stigmatizing them, 134 and might perpetuate black underperformance
on standard tests, thereby confirming “the bigot’s prophecy,” 135 he argued.
Similarly, Justice Thomas used non-originalist reasoning in 2007 in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. 136
Justice Thomas joined Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court, but
wrote a separate thirty-four page concurrence to respond to the dissent.
Again, he repeatedly asserted a broad anti-classification principle, 137 but
one not linked to evidence of original intent, understanding, or meaning.
The sole originalist reference came in a footnote responding to a point in
the dissent. Justice Thomas wrote, “I have no quarrel with the proposition
that the Fourteenth Amendment sought to bring former slaves into American society as full members.” 138 He continued:
What the dissent fails to understand, however, is that the colorblind Constitution does not bar the government from taking
measures to remedy past state-sponsored discrimination—indeed,
it requires that such measures be taken in certain circumstances. . . . Race-based government measures during the 1860’s and
1870’s to remedy state-enforced slavery were therefore not inconsistent with the color-blind Constitution. 139
In addition to precedent, Justice Thomas used consequential arguments
in Parents Involved. The “race-based student-assignment programs before
us are not as benign as the dissent believes,” he asserted, since, as he wrote
in Adarand, “[r]acial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as
poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination.” 140 This type
of race conscious decisionmaking “pits the races against one another, exacerbates racial tension, and ‘provoke[s] resentment among those who believe
that they have been wronged by the government’s use of race,’” he stated,
again citing his Adarand opinion. 141 Justice Thomas repeatedly invoked the
134. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. Id. at 377.
136. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
137. Id. at 751 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Constitution generally prohibits government
race-based decisionmaking, but this Court has authorized the use of race-based measures for remedial purposes in two narrowly defined circumstances.”); see also id. at 752 (“Rather, racebased government decisionmaking is categorically prohibited unless narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest.”); id. (“‘The Constitution abhors classifications based on race . . . .’”); id.
(“Therefore, as a general rule, all race-based government decisionmaking—regardless of context—is unconstitutional.”); id. at 758 (“We have made it unusually clear that strict scrutiny applies to every racial classification.”); id. at 766 n.14 (“The United States Constitution dictates that
local governments cannot make decisions on the basis of race.”).
138. Id. at 772 n.19.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id.
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“colorblind” Constitution 142 metaphor, an ideal he associated with the first
Justice Harlan and with Thurgood Marshall,143 while likening the dissenters
in Parents Involved to the segregationists in Brown v. Board of Education.
Once again, he failed to connect that idea to originalist sources.
Most recently, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 144 Justice
Thomas joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion but wrote a concurring
opinion to argue that Grutter should be overruled. His twenty page opinion
exceeded the combined length of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia’s concurrence, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent but contained no originalist argument. Justice Thomas cited his concurring or dissenting opinions in Jenkins, Adarand, and Grutter regarding the perils of racial classification and
argued that Grutter was inconsistent with the Court’s precedents. Racial
diversity could not produce benefits that would satisfy the Court’s “compelling interest” or “pressing necessity” tests. The premise of much of his argument was that race-based decisionmaking, whether for Jim Crow segregation or affirmative action, are moral equivalents. Finally, he made the
utilitarian argument that affirmative action has “insidious consequences.” 145
He never suggested, however, that the original intent, understanding, expectation, or meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded race conscious
decisionmaking to produce diversity nor did he offer any historical evidence to support those positions. 146
In view of Justice Thomas’s professed commitment to originalism and
the prominent role some variation of that methodology plays in so many of
his significant constitutional opinions, his quite different approach in race
cases is, to say the least, intriguing. In constitutional cases involving race,
he does not explicitly invoke originalism and his references to originalist
sources, if any, are striking in their brevity and cryptic nature. If anything,
the summary of these five cases dealing with race overstates his resort to
originalism since it presents each potentially originalist reference in those

142. Id. at 772 (“Most of the dissent’s criticisms of today’s result can be traced to its rejection
of the colorblind Constitution.”); id. at 780 (“In place of the colorblind Constitution, the dissent
would permit measures to keep the races together and proscribe measures to keep the races
apart.”); id. at 782 (“Because ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens,’ such race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional.”).
143. For a criticism of the assertion that Thurgood Marshall and the other attorneys representing school children in Brown were anti-classificationists, see Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice Roberts’ Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 791 (2008).
144. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
145. Id. at 2431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
146. This brief summary does not exhaust the constitutional cases dealing with race in which
Justice Thomas has written discretionary opinions without invoking originalism. See, e.g., Bush
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999–1000 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for an application of
strict scrutiny to review intentional creation of majority-minority districts based on Adarand, not
originalism).
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opinions though greatly condensing the non-originalist arguments that dominate those opinions. Whereas, generally, Justice Thomas presents the
originalist arguments for his positions in detail, with extensive citation to
wide-ranging sources, in race cases, he mentions the few originalist references in passing and with little or no elaboration to suggest that they establish original intent, understanding, or meaning. Instead, he relies on precedent and on moral and consequentialist arguments, all of which are
delivered in an impassioned manner. A reader of Justice Thomas’s constitutional opinions on race might find them powerful and compelling, but not
originalist.
The discrepancy between Justice Thomas’s methodology in constitutional cases involving race and those involving many other constitutional
subjects is only part of what invites attention. It becomes even more suspect due to the uneasy fit perceived between originalism and the conclusions Justice Thomas reaches in race cases involving claims of equal protection.
First, most who have studied the subject doubt that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, based on originalist methodology alone, proscribed “separate
but equal” in public schools. A strong consensus has concluded that neither
the Framers nor ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment nor informed citizens at the time expected the Amendment to outlaw racially segregated
schools. 147 Unless the expected applications of the ratifiers or the public are
ignored in determining original meaning or unless original meaning is determined at a very high level of generality, as some advocate, it is hard to

147. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1955) (concluding that Congress, which drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment, did not intend to preclude segregated schools); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 5, 10 (2011); Randall Kennedy, Colorblind Constitutionalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4
(2013); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881 (1995); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History
of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 & n.180 (1991); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to Professor McConnell, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 223, 224, 226, 231 (1996); David A. Strauss, Do We Have a Living Constitution?, 59
DRAKE L. REV. 973, 978 (2011); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489–90 (1954)
(describing original intent as “inconclusive” but rejecting the idea that constitutional meaning in
1954 is equivalent to that in 1868); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 105 (2011) (criticizing McConnell for focusing on the original expected application of the drafters but noting in his
statement that the ratifiers and the public supported school segregation). But see Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 953–54 (1995)
[hereinafter McConnell, Desegregation Decisions] (contesting scholarly consensus and arguing
that in the decade following ratification of Fourteenth Amendment many political leaders believed
it outlawed school segregation); Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown:
A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937, 1937 (1995).
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reconcile Brown and Bolling with originalism. 148 Many originalists once
conceded as much. 149 Since an interpretive theory must be measured in part
based on the substantive outcomes it generates,150 any inconsistency between originalism and Brown-Bolling impeaches originalism rather seriously.
Justice Thomas is certainly not prepared to relinquish either holding.
He has criticized the Court’s reasoning in Brown 151 but has left no doubt
that he believes it and Bolling were correctly decided. 152 On other occasions, he has determined original meaning based on the actual or expected
applications the framing generation gave various constitutional language. 153
Giving such priority to expected applications of the 1791 or 1868 generations regarding the constitutionality of segregated schools would make both
decisions problematic.154 Justice Thomas has not addressed this problem
in relation to his professed theory.

148. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 233 (1980) (“I cannot think of a plausible argument against [the Bolling] result—other than
the entirely correct originalist observation that it is not supported by even a generous reading of
the fifth amendment.”); Fallon, supra note 147, at 10; William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional
Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1262–63 (2011); David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and
Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT 299, 304–05 (2005).
149. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 350, 352 (1988) (suggesting that desegregation cases were inconsistent with
original intent of Constitution); Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional Theory”: The Attempted Justification for the Supreme Court’s Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L. REV. 789, 796–97 (1987);
Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 233–34 (1972) (suggesting Bolling was wrong in concluding the Fifth Amendment prohibited segregated schools in
Washington, D.C. based on its text, history, and political structure, all of which differed from that
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
150. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535,
538–39, 579 (1999) (arguing for the relevancy of likely outcomes of a theory in assessing it). Cf.
McConnell, Desegregation Decisions, supra note 147, at 952 (conceding that any theory not able
to generate the result in Brown would be discredited).
151. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
152. See id. (supporting outcome but not rationale in Brown); Thomas Hearings, supra note 6,
at 414 (stating he has no quarrel with Bolling).
153. See, e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (using
practice at the time of the founding to determine the meaning of the Fifth Amendment Self Incrimination Clause); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (using actual and expected applications to argue that the First Amendment does not protect student
speech); McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 364 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment) (using expected and actual applications to argue that the First Amendment protected
anonymous speech); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 897–98 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (using
early practice to argue that multi-member districts were not unconstitutional).
154. Berger, supra note 149, at 352; see also supra note 147. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (terming circumstances surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment as “[a]t best . . . inconclusive” regarding the constitutionality of separate but equal).
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Second, originalism raises questions regarding Justice Thomas’s repeated insistence that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment envision a
color-blind Constitution and compel an anti-classificationist approach.
Some respected scholars have argued that those conclusions are inconsistent
with originalism. They have argued that, based on originalist sources these
clauses permit race conscious decisionmaking to benefit blacks and, in the
case of the Fourteenth Amendment, were actually designed to protect
blacks, not whites. 155 Some of this scholarship has been around for decades, yet in his opinions, Justice Thomas has neither adopted nor even discussed these findings that suggest affirmative action is consistent with original meaning. 156 This silence is intriguing, 157 especially since Justice
Thomas managed to cite Professor McConnell’s article the month after it
was published.
It is, of course, possible to argue that Justice Thomas’s commitment to
anti-classificationism and color-blindness reflect the best interpretations of
equal protection, but these conclusions are contested, controversial, and not
the only plausible readings of the text. Nor are they compelled by originalism. Raoul Berger wrote in 1988 that words like equal protection are “susceptible of an enormous range of meaning.” 158 He cautioned that unless
cabined by original intent, “those words serve as a crystal ball from which a
judge, like a soothsayer, can draw forth anything he wants.” 159 Justice
Thomas has not based his conclusions regarding the meaning of that language on evidence of original intent, understanding, expectations, or meaning. He has simply asserted his reading and justified it using precedential,
moral, and consequential arguments.

155. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427, 429–432 (1997) (claiming
that proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment passed laws specifically directed to benefit blacks);
Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71
VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985) (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment intended affirmative action be used to help blacks); Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact ColorConscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 481–82 (1998); see also Jonathan
L. Entin, Justice Thomas, Race, and the Constitution Through the Lens of Booker T. Washington
and W.E.B. Du Bois, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 755, 755 (2011); Marshall, supra note 104, at
1230 (stating that strong historical evidence suggests affirmative action is consistent with the
Framers’ view of the Fourteenth Amendment).
156. See, e.g., André Douglas Pond Cummings, Grutter v. Bollinger, Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action and the Treachery of Originalism: “The Sun Don’t Shine Here in This Part of
Town,” 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 46, 62 (2005) (criticizing Thomas for not considering
evidence that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended affirmative action be used to
help blacks); Fallon, supra note 147, at 17; Rubenfeld, supra note 155, at, 427, 432.
157. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 104, at 1230 (accusing conservatives of selective use of
originalism).
158. Berger, supra note 149, at 351.
159. Id.
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The disparity is obvious between Justice Thomas’s professed and frequent recourse to originalism in constitutional cases generally and his abandonment of it when race is involved. Although some of Justice Thomas’s
admirers have celebrated his principled originalism with little or no recognition of its disappearance in race cases, Professor Scott Gerber, the author
of a book-length study of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence and of other
works about him, has observed that Justice Thomas uses a different approach in interpreting constitutional provisions regarding race than he employs for those relating to other matters. 160 Professor Gerber has offered
what he characterizes as the oversimplified generalization that “Justice
Thomas is a ‘liberal originalist’ on civil rights and a ‘conservative originalist’ on civil liberties and federalism.” He argues that “Justice Thomas appeals to the ideal of equality at the heart of the Declaration of Independence” in interpreting constitutional clauses regarding race, but to “the
Framers’ specific intentions” in addressing certain other constitutional issues. 161 Professor Gerber concludes that, in race cases, Justice Thomas’s
classical liberal or Lockean approach is reflected in his insistence that “the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic or religious groups.” 162 Professor Gerber has recently repeated
this analysis which he initially based on his study of Justice Thomas’s first
years on the Court. In a 2011 article, he wrote that Justice Thomas’s civil
rights opinions invoke “the principle of inherent equality at the heart of the
Declaration of Independence.” 163
To be sure, before joining the Court, Justice Thomas argued that the
commitment of the Declaration of Independence to equality and liberty animated the Constitution164 and that the latter should be read accordingly.
This argument seems problematic in assigning original meaning to the Constitution of 1789 or 1791 given the document’s acceptance of slavery and
racial inequality. 165 The Declaration may have expressed a powerful aspira160. SCOTT D. GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS 193
(1999).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted). For an elaboration of liberal originalism,
see SCOTT D. GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 6–8 (1995).
163. Scott D. Gerber, Justice for Clarence Thomas: An Intellectual History of Justice Thomas’s Twenty Years on the Supreme Court, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 667, 671 (2011).
164. Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 983–84 (1987).
165. Marshall, supra note 104, at 1230 n.71 (“There is, of course, no originalist argument supporting the claim that the federal government is precluded from supporting affirmative action.”);
see also Graglia, supra note 149, at 796–97 (arguing that the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause could not originally have prohibited racial discrimination given the Constitution’s acceptance of slavery); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631,
636–37 (1993).
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tion but it seems hard to argue that the Constitution’s original intent or
meaning was anti-classificationist, color-blind or racially egalitarian since it
protected slavery 166 and treated slaves as three-fifths of a person. 167 Indeed,
during his confirmation hearings, Judge Thomas acknowledged that the
Civil War Amendments were necessary to end slavery, a concession that
would seem to rebut any effort to construe the original meaning of the preCivil War Constitution as precluding discrimination against blacks. 168
Moreover, any effort to give “liberty” in the Fifth Amendment such a robust
reading would conflict with Justice Thomas’s general approach to Due Process which assigns “liberty” a much more modest meaning and views the
Clause as providing procedural, not substantive, protections.169
Yet even if the Declaration did infuse the Constitution’s original
meaning with egalitarianism (notwithstanding the inconsistent practices and
attitude of many of the Framers and their generation), Justice Thomas has
not asserted that point in race cases to justify his conclusions. On those few
occasions where he has invoked the Declaration, he has done so in conclusory fashion 170 without offering anything even approaching an argument
that it provides the original meaning of the Constitution or the evidence to
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the
Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held
to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, But shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including
those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all
other Persons.”).
168. Thomas Hearings, supra note 6, at 272.
169. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3062 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The notion that a constitutional provision that
guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could define the
substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of words.”); Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 769 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“And
the notion that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a wellspring of unenumerated
rights against the Federal Government ‘strains credulity for even the most casual user of words.’”
(citing Justice Thomas’s McDonald concurrence)); see also id. at 764–65 (Scalia, J., concurring,
joined by Justice Thomas) (“This case is easily resolved on the simple ground that the Due Process Clause does not ‘guarante[e] certain (unspecified) liberties’; rather, it ‘merely guarantees certain procedures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty.’” (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
170. See, e.g., A Conversation with Justice Clarence Thomas, IMPRIMIS, Oct. 2007, available
at, http://www.collier.k12.fl.us/character/docs/resources/ClarenceThomas.pdf (“We should always
start, when we read the Constitution, by reading the Declaration, because it gives us the reasons
why the structure of the Constitution was designed the way it was.”); see also Adarand v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

108

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:79

support that position. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, he asserted that
“slavery, and the measures designed to protect it, were irreconcilable with
the principles of equality, government by consent, and inalienable rights
proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence and embedded in our constitutional structure.” 171 Justice Thomas supported that proposition by citing one statement by Luther Martin at the Philadelphia Convention and
Abraham Lincoln’s 1854 Peoria Speech. It seems unnecessary to state that
these two citations, separately and together, do not provide an originalist
case that the Declaration of Independence was part of the Constitution or
that the Constitution that allowed slavery prohibited discrimination against
blacks. Justice Thomas implicitly conceded the point in his next statement
when he acknowledged that “[a]fter the war, a series of constitutional
amendments were adopted to repair the Nation from the damage slavery
had caused.” 172 If the Declaration provides the original meaning of the
Constitution in race cases, one would expect Justice Thomas to cite it routinely in judicial opinions and to provide an explanation in them regarding
why his conclusion is compelling. 173 He has rarely cited the Declaration in
opinions and has not explained why his conclusion is compelling in his
opinions on the Court.
Moreover, even if Professor Gerber accurately stated the difference in
Justice Thomas’s approach (that is, liberal vs. conservative originalist) his
description does not justify that dichotomy in the context of Justice Thomas’s other judicial behavior. To be sure, “liberty” and “equal protection”
are abstract concepts but so, too, are “freedom of speech” and “cruel and
unusual punishment” among other constitutional terms. In construing other
open-ended language, Justice Thomas has often looked to the intent, beliefs,
and practices of the Framers and ratifiers to infer meaning. 174 Why, for instance, does Justice Thomas believe it appropriate to invoke original expectations in determining whether anonymous leafleting or children’s speech
are “freedom of speech” or whether executing a fourteen-year-old is “cruel

171. 130 S. Ct. at 3059. Justice Thomas’s argument is not convincing on its merits. The fact
that slavery was “irreconcilable” with “principles of equality, government by consent, and inalienable rights” does not mean that the original meaning of the Constitution can be determined without considering the protection the Constitution gave that institution.
172. Id. at 3060.
173. Contra Eastman, supra note 123, at 704.
174. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2483–85 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(looking to practices at the time of the founding regarding trying and executing minors to determine the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131
S. Ct. 2729, 2752 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (looking to the beliefs of the founding generation to interpret the First Amendment); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 359–
71 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (looking to the discussions of the Framers and ratifiers as well
as their practices and beliefs to determine the original understanding of the First Amendment regarding anonymous political leafleting).
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and unusual,” but he does not consider whether the founders or their generation believed in desegregated schools or affirmative action?
Most recently, in fact after this Article was submitted for consideration, Professor Ralph A. Rossum published a book-length study of Justice
Thomas’s jurisprudence in which he argued that Justice Thomas has followed an original general meaning approach to constitutional interpretation
including cases dealing with race.175 Starting from Professor Maggs’s insight that Justice Thomas has used original intent, understanding, and public meaning in different cases, Professor Rossum argues that Justice Thomas “has incorporated all three of these approaches into his own distinctive
original general meaning approach” which he uses when the meaning of the
Constitution’s text is not apparent. 176
Putting aside the accuracy of Professor Rossum’s claim that Justice
Thomas uses a coherent and distinctive “original general meaning approach,” one which seems inconsistent with language Justice Thomas has
sometimes used celebrating original intent or understanding, Professor Rossum demonstrates convincingly that Justice Thomas uses the various
originalist arguments to interpret a range of constitutional clauses. He is
less persuasive when he argues that Justice Thomas uses his original general meaning approach in cases dealing with race.
The problem Professor Rossum’s argument encounters is that Justice
Thomas simply has not invoked original intent, original understanding,
original expected applications, or original public meaning in his opinions
dealing with constitutional questions involving race to interpret the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clauses. Indeed, in his twenty-two page summary of Justice Thomas’s opinions in these cases, 177 Professor Rossum uses
the phrase “original general meaning” only once, and then in describing
Justice Thomas’s discussion of the Court’s equitable powers under Article
III in Missouri v. Jenkins,178 not regarding any clause protecting equality or
liberty in the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
Professor Rossum does view Justice Thomas’s positions on desegregation and racial preference in these cases as originalist, but based largely on
arguments Justice Thomas made in two short law review articles179 he
175. ROSSUM, supra note 98.
176. Id. at 13. Cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3072 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (describing the drafters’ statements as relevant to determining the most likely public
understanding of a provision at the time of ratification, especially if the statements were publicly
disseminated).
177. ROSSUM, supra note 98, at 190–212.
178. Id. at 195–96.
179. Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 64–65 (1989); Thomas, supra note
164, at 983–88.
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wrote before he joined the Court 180 in which he argued that the Declaration
of Independence animates the Constitution. Although Justice Thomas has
cited the Declaration twice in cases dealing with race, it is curious to say the
least that he has not incorporated the arguments from, or cited to, these articles in his opinions dealing with race during the twenty-three years he has
served on the Court. Moreover, his articles offer little evidence that the
original intent, original understanding, original expected applications, or
original meaning of the original Constitution or the Civil War Amendments
incorporated the Declaration. They likewise offer little evidence that “liberty” or “equal protection” were intended, understood, or meant by the founders or by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment (or by their respective
generations) to prohibit racial segregation or race conscious decisionmaking to benefit African-Americans. That Justice Thomas believes the
Declaration’s commitment to equality leads to these conclusions does not
mean that the original intent, understanding, meaning, or the original general meaning of its or the Constitution’s concepts produces that result.
Those questions depend on historical proof, yet the sort of evidence that
Justice Thomas frequently presents in discussing other constitutional clauses from contemporary dictionaries and legal treatises, from the debates
proposing or ratifying the relevant constitutional language and from contemporary practice is absent from his opinions on race and from these articles.
Professor Jonathan Entin has taken a different approach in discussing
Justice Thomas’s general commitment to originalism yet its absence in his
opinions on race. He has recognized that race cases present a “conspicuous
exception” to Justice Thomas’s commitment to originalism181 but has argued that Justice Thomas’s “powerful and distinctive argument against affirmative action” and in support of color blindness “deserves serious consideration on its own terms.” 182 Ultimately, Justice Thomas’s approach in
these cases “demonstrates that even a committed originalist need not blindly follow any particular interpretive theory, especially when addressing important questions to which the Constitution does not provide explicit answers.” 183
Even if one agrees that Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence in the constitutional cases involving race “deserves serious consideration,” Professor Entin is quite generous in excusing this inconsistency in Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence. For Justice Thomas, originalism does not provide one

180. ROSSUM, supra note 98, at 183–90.
181. Entin, supra note 155, at 755.
182. Id. at 768; see also Mark Tushnet, Clarence Thomas’s Black Nationalism, 47 HOW. L.J.
323, 329–31 (2004).
183. Entin, supra note 155, at 768.
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interpretive tool in a pluralistic jurisprudential approach that recognizes the
validity of various forms of constitutional argument. On the contrary, Justice Thomas has celebrated originalism as the only “legitimate” and “impartial” way to interpret the Constitution and has likened non-originalist approaches to “mak[ing] it up” and compared their constitutional validity to
that of “the latest football scores.”184 Professor Entin may be right that Justice Thomas’s race jurisprudence is “powerful and distinctive” and merits
serious consideration, but that does not explain the disappearance of
originalism in those opinions and the resort there to forms of argument Justice Thomas has disparaged.
What is striking is not simply the discrepancy between Justice Thomas’s repeated and uncompromising professed commitment to originalism
and his reliance on it in many constitutional cases on the one hand and his
abandonment of it in those dealing with race on the other hand. What is also noteworthy is Justice Thomas’s failure to account for this deviation between his approach in race cases and his prescription of originalism as essential to judicial impartiality; this silence is disappointing, particularly
from a justice who has been relatively outspoken otherwise regarding constitutional interpretation.
Ultimately, the marked divergence suggests that something other than
originalism really drives his jurisprudence, at least in part. One possibility
is that political conservatism, not originalism, motivates Justice Thomas’s
judicial behavior. 185 With few exceptions, 186 he reaches conservative results in constitutional cases when he deploys some originalist methodology
and in race cases when he abandons it. This explanation is neither novel 187
nor particularly surprising. Originalism tends to be associated with conservative justices and academics. Originalism has been “a central organizing principle” for the conservative assault on the liberal decisions of the
1960s and 1970s and has furnished a tool for political mobilization as well
as for jurisprudential use. 188 Moreover, as Richard H. Fallon, Jr. has point-

184. Thomas, supra note 26.
185. See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 160, at 211–15 (presenting data showing Justice Thomas’s
conservative voting behavior during his first five terms on the Court).
186. See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); United States v. Bajakajian,
524 U.S. 321 (1998); McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995).
187. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 563 (2006) (arguing that Justice Thomas’s selective “originalism appears as neither hypocrisy nor a cynical manipulation of the past, but instead
as a sincere expression of passionate ideological commitment”); Eric J. Segall, Justice Thomas
and Affirmative Action: Bad Faith, Confusion or Both?, 3 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 111,
119 (2013) (accusing Justice Thomas of “judicial hypocrisy and judicial hubris of the worst
kind”); Marshall, supra note 104, at 1243–44 (accusing judicial conservatives of hypocrisy).
188. Post & Siegel, supra note 187, at 545–46, 554–61; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Political Function of Originalist Ambiguity, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 492 (1996) (calling
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ed out, originalists, like others, tend to justify their methodology in part on
consequential grounds, a practice that inevitably invites their ideology into
the calculation. 189 Originalism thus may appeal to Justice Thomas as an instrument to reach results consistent with his conservative ideology. When it
fails to lead to conservative results, he may sacrifice the instrument for the
preferred outcome.
There are, however, some responses to this argument. Not often, but
occasionally, Justice Thomas uses originalism to reach or defend a result
that is not ostensibly conservative. For instance, in McIntyre, he used an
originalist argument to strike down a statute that would have limited anonymous political speech. 190 The majority consisted largely of more liberal
justices—Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer—although Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy also joined Justice Stevens’s opinion while Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia dissented. More recently, Justice
Thomas concluded that the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a criminal defendant a jury trial with respect to a finding that could
increase a mandatory minimum sentence.191 Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined all or part of his opinion, whereas the four more
conservative justices dissented.
There is, however, a second, more complicated, possibility. It may be
that Justice Thomas is generally committed to originalism for jurisprudential reasons and that this commitment helps explain his behavior in most
constitutional areas. But he also has strong beliefs and feelings about certain issues that arise in constitutional cases relating to race. It may be that
in these cases the strength of these perspectives simply overwhelms his attachment to the dictates of originalism.
III. JUSTICE THOMAS AND RACE
There is more worth saying about Justice Thomas’s treatment of race
in constitutional cases than noting his abandonment of originalism in that
context for more than two decades. That observation begins rather than
ends the discussion. Justice Thomas’s work on the Supreme Court on constitutional cases involving race is distinctive and revealing. The topic en-

originalism “most often a political or rhetorical stalking horse for a set of substantive positions
with respect to a relatively narrow set of constitutional issues in the current age”); Thomas W.
Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 271, 273–74 (2005) (arguing that attitudes towards certain salient Court decisions
shape theorists’ views regarding originalism and precedent).
189. Fallon, supra note 104, at 24–28.
190. 514 U.S. at 358.
191. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155–64 (2013).
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gages him often. He writes about race with a passion rarely evident in his
Supreme Court opinions.
Justice Thomas’s distinctive engagement in constitutional matters
dealing with race is evident in at least three ways. First, Justice Thomas often writes discretionary opinions about racial issues, both in cases where
those matters are presented for decision as well as in cases addressing other
topics. Mention has previously been made of Justice Thomas’s concurrences in Adarand, Jenkins, Parents Involved, and Fisher, and his opinion in
Grutter, all of which addressed either school desegregation or raceconscious decisionmaking. These five opinions represent only part of Justice Thomas’s corpus of judicial writings dealing with race.
Justice Thomas’s engagement regarding matters dealing with race became apparent during his first term on the Court. In Georgia v.
McCollum, 192 a case argued only four months after he joined the Court, Justice Thomas criticized the line of cases holding that the Constitution limits
the use of peremptory challenges on racial grounds in jury selection. 193 Justice Thomas argued that the cases, beginning with Batson v. Kentucky, 194
“take[] us further from the reasoning and the result of Strauder v. West Virginia” 195 and would produce regrettable consequences in “restricting a
criminal defendant’s use of such challenges.”196 Justice Thomas worried
about the impact on black criminal defendants. 197 “I am certain that black
criminal defendants will rue the day that this Court ventured down this road
that inexorably will lead to the elimination of peremptory strikes,” he
wrote. 198 Justice Thomas thought the Court should recognize that racial
composition impacted jury outcomes and accordingly should allow racemotivated peremptory strikes based on the supposition that racial identity
would affect juror behavior. 199
In United States v. Fordice, 200 argued the month after he joined the
Court, Justice Thomas agreed with the Court’s conclusion that aspects of
Mississippi’s system of higher education still reflected effects of policies
traceable to de jure segregation but wrote a separate concurrence partly to
argue that the Court’s standard “portends neither the destruction of historically black colleges nor the severing of those institutions from their distinc-

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

505 U.S. 42 (1992).
Id. at 60–62 (Thomas, J., concurring).
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 60; 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 60–61.
505 U.S. 717 (1992).

114

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:79

tive histories and traditions.” 201 Although a state could not close “particular
institutions, historically white or historically black, to particular racial
groups,” Justice Thomas argued that “it hardly follows that a State cannot
operate a diverse assortment of institutions—including historically black
institutions—open to all on a race-neutral basis, but with established traditions and programs that might disproportionately appeal to one race or another.” 202 Justice Thomas insisted on a race neutral admissions policy, yet
his resolution specifically endorsed State activity promoting, on a race conscious basis, programs to appeal to “particular racial groups.”203 Justice
Thomas clearly believed that historically black colleges have continuing
value, an idea he has reiterated more recently, 204 and noted the irony if “the
institutions that sustained blacks during segregation were themselves destroyed in an effort to combat its vestiges.” 205 Justice Thomas distinguished
between such “institutional diversity,” which was designed to confer educational advantage, from duplication designed to separate students based on
race. 206
In the voting rights context, Justice Thomas has attacked approaches
that, in his view, equate race with political interests or suggest that minorities only receive representation by those from their racial group.207 In
Holder v. Hall, Justice Thomas accused the Court of “systematically dividing the country into electoral districts along racial lines—an enterprise of
segregating the races into political homelands that amounts, in truth, to
nothing short of a system of ‘political apartheid.’” 208 The Court’s voting
dilution jurisprudence “should be repugnant to any nation that strives for
the ideal of a color-blind Constitution.” 209 Justice Thomas complained that
201. Id. at 745.
202. Id. at 748–49.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 763
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“There is also evidence that black students attending historically
black colleges achieve better academic results than those attending predominantly white colleges.”).
205. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 749.
206. Id. (“No one, I imagine, would argue that such institutional diversity is without ‘sound
educational justification,’ or that it is even remotely akin to program duplication, which is designed to separate the races for the sake of separating the races.”).
207. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 903 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Far more pernicious has been the Court’s willingness to accept the one underlying premise that must inform every minority vote dilution claim: the assumption that the group asserting dilution is not merely a
racial or ethnic group, but a group having distinct political interests as well. Of necessity, in resolving vote dilution actions we have given credence to the view that race defines political interest. We have acted on the implicit assumption that members of racial and ethnic groups must all
think alike on important matters of public policy and must have their own ‘minority preferred’
representatives holding seats in elected bodies if they are to be considered represented at all.”).
208. Id. at 905 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)).
209. Id. at 905–06.
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the Court’s approach would “exacerbate racial tensions” and “deepen racial
divisions by destroying any need for voters or candidates to build bridges
between racial groups or to form voting coalitions.” 210
To be sure, Georgia v. McCollum, United States v. Fordice, and Holder v. Hall were cases in which race was closely connected to the issue presented to the Court for decision. Yet Justice Thomas has introduced America’s racial history or public policy considerations regarding race into
opinions in cases where the constitutional issues presented for decision had
a more tenuous relationship to race. In Dawson v. Delaware, 211 Justice
Thomas alone dissented from a decision holding that Delaware had improperly offered evidence at a sentencing hearing about a defendant’s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood Prison Gang. 212 Justice Thomas disagreed
with the conclusion of the other justices that membership simply associated
Dawson with abstract ideas, not actions, in violation of the First Amendment. 213 Justice Thomas thought the jury could reasonably infer past forbidden activity and future dangerous behavior from such membership. 214
To some extent, Justice Thomas’s difference with the others on the Court
stemmed from the fact that Dawson belonged to a prison gang, not necessarily the Aryan Brotherhood. Yet he frequently referenced Dawson’s association with a “racist” gang and argued that the jury could reasonably infer that its members acted upon “their racial prejudice.” 215 Justice Thomas
argued that Dawson’s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood suggested bad
character, which was relevant information for the jury. 216
In Graham v. Collins, 217 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion
largely dedicated to connecting the restrictions on death penalty sentences
to the Court’s concern with race bias against blacks. Justice Thomas ended
a five page discussion by concluding that “[i]t cannot be doubted that behind the Court’s condemnation of unguided discretion lay the specter of racial prejudice—the paradigmatic capricious and irrational sentencing factor.” 218
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 219 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring
opinion in a case considering whether a Cleveland school voucher plan vio210. Id. at 907.
211. 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
212. Id. at 169 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 171.
214. Id. at 173–76.
215. Id. at 171–73.
216. Id. at 175.
217. 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 484; see also id. at 500 (referring to “the concerns about racial discrimination that
inspired our decision in Furman”).
219. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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lated the Establishment Clause. He argued that the Establishment Clause
did not limit states as much as it restricted the federal government. 220 But
the thrust of his concurrence addressed the lack of educational opportunities
for inner city minorities. “Today, however, the promise of public school
education has failed poor inner-city blacks,” he wrote. 221 While the “cognoscenti” might champion “the romanticized ideal of universal public education,” “poor urban families” had an altogether different priority, namely
“the best education for their children.” 222
The following term, Justice Thomas used Virginia v. Black, 223 a case
concerning whether a Virginia statute outlawing cross-burning to intimidate
someone violated the First Amendment, to deliver a historical discussion
regarding the racist underpinnings of cross-burning. 224 Justice Thomas had
previously denounced the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) and its use of the cross in
Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette. 225 Although Pinette involved a
municipality’s denial of the KKK’s petition to display, not burn, a cross on
public property, Justice Thomas was moved to write separately to recall,
and denounce, the KKK’s history. He wrote:
There is little doubt that the Klan’s main objective is to establish a racist white government in the United States. In Klan ceremony, the cross is a symbol of white supremacy and a tool for
the intimidation and harassment of racial minorities, Catholics,
Jews, Communists, and any other groups hated by the Klan. The
cross is associated with the Klan not because of religious worship, but because of the Klan’s practice of cross burning . . . . 226
The Klan, Justice Thomas wrote, had “appropriated one of the most sacred
of religious symbols as a symbol of hate.” 227
He reprised that theme in 2003 in Virginia v. Black. Justice Thomas
signaled the importance of the issue by participating in a surprising forum
for him, oral argument on December 11, 2002. Justice Thomas twice accused the Deputy Solicitor General, representing the President George W.
Bush Justice Department, of “understating . . . the effects” of cross-burning,
three times associated the KKK with terror, and called cross-burning a
unique activity. 228
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
2002).

Id. at 678–80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 682.
Id.
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
Id. at 388–95 (Thomas, J., concurring).
515 U.S. 753 (1995).
Id. at 770 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 771.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (Dec. 11,
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Justice Thomas continued that discussion in his solitary dissent where
he argued that cross-burning could never be protected speech. “In every
culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can
comprehend,” he began, and cross-burning was “the paradigmatic example”
of the “profane.” 229 The KKK is “[t]he world’s oldest, most persistent terrorist organization” and one long engaged in criminal activity and still fanatically opposing racial equality, he wrote.230 Cross-burning was not a
form of expression but vicious, terroristic conduct, and even the Virginia
legislature of the 1950s, one which favored segregationist expression, understood the difference. He wrote:
It strains credulity to suggest that a state legislature that adopted
a litany of segregationist laws self-contradictorily intended to
squelch the segregationist message. Even for segregationists,
violent and terroristic conduct, the Siamese twin of cross burning,
was intolerable. The ban on cross burning with intent to intimidate demonstrates that even segregationists understood the difference between intimidating and terroristic conduct and racist expression. It is simply beyond belief that, in passing the statute
now under review, the Virginia Legislature was concerned with
anything but penalizing conduct it must have viewed as particularly vicious. 231
Whereas Virginia v. Black provided an occasion for Justice Thomas to
discuss at length the KKK’s racist activities in a free speech case, he wrote
a discretionary opinion in Kelo v. New London, 232 a takings case, to discuss
the adverse impact of urban renewal programs on African-Americans. Justice Thomas joined Justice O’Connor’s principal dissent but also wrote separately, primarily to argue that the Court had strayed from the original
meaning of the Public Use requirement of the Takings Clause.233 But at the
end of his opinion he discussed the “consequences of today’s decision,”
namely the tendency of urban renewal programs disproportionately to hurt
poor, urban nonwhite communities.234 “Urban renewal projects have long
been associated with the displacement of blacks,” and the decision in Kelo
would “exacerbate these effects.” 235

229. Virginia, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 388–89 (quoting M. NEWTON & J. NEWTON, THE KU KLUX KLAN: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA vii (1991)).
231. Id. at 394.
232. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
233. Id. at 514–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 521.
235. Id. at 522.
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More recently, in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v.
Holder, 236 Justice Thomas departed from the other justices, who all joined
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in concluding that granting a litigant bailout
relief under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act avoided the constitutional
issue. 237 Only Justice Thomas reached the constitutional issue and concluded that Section 5 was unconstitutional. In explaining why it was no longer
constitutional, he devoted seven paragraphs to describing how blacks were
denied the vote for decades through the use of violence as well as “subtle
methods.” 238
Finally, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause, not its Due Process Clause, was the vehicle by which
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was made applicable as
against the states.239 A considerable portion of his rather lengthy opinion is
devoted to discussing efforts in the south before and after the Civil War to
terrorize African-Americans, including disarming them to render them defenseless against mob violence.240 He argued that the public understood the
purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as affording protection to
African-Americans of rights of citizens including the right to keep and bear
arms for defensive purposes. 241
These examples illustrate Justice Thomas’s practice of using discretionary opinions to recount aspects of America’s racist past or express concerns regarding the impact of certain constitutional doctrine or public policies on racial minorities. Although some of the cases address constitutional
issues under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses, in other instances
Justice Thomas introduced race-related considerations in cases which ostensibly involved other constitutional provisions.
The intensity of these opinions suggests a second characteristic of Justice Thomas’s work when he writes about race. In these opinions, Justice
Thomas’s rhetoric often suggests a high degree of engagement, indeed passion, in the positions advanced. For instance, he began his concurrence in
Missouri v. Jenkins by observing, “It never ceases to amaze me that the
courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black
must be inferior.” 242 He went on to argue that those who identify “racial
isolation” as a vice subscribe to a “theory of black inferiority.”243
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

557 U.S. 193 (2009).
Id. at 212 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 218–23.
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058–88 (2010).
Id. at 3078–88.
Id.
515 U.S. 70, 114 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 122.
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In Adarand, he argued that morally, as well as constitutionally, affirmative action was as objectionable as malevolent discrimination.244 He began
his Grutter opinion with an excerpt from Frederick Douglass’s impassioned
1865 speech, “What the Black Man Wants,” which he followed by stating
that “[l]ike Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of
American life without the meddling of university administrators.” 245 He
blasted the “aestheticists” who perform “their social experiments on other
people’s children” and who lure minorities in to situations in which failure
is inevitable. 246
In Parents Involved, he equated the position Justice Breyer and other
dissenters took to that of the bigots who espoused Jim Crow laws and practices in earlier eras. 247 Even to a proponent of an anti-classificationist, color-blind view of the Equal Protection Clause, equating Justice Breyer to the
Orville Faubuses of the world is extreme and inconsistent with the civil discourse Justice Thomas has championed on other occasions.248
In his concurrence in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, Justice
Thomas again drew a moral and constitutional equivalence between affirmative action and Jim Crow segregation.249 This time he accused Justice
Ginsburg of harboring “the benighted notion that it is possible to tell when
discrimination helps, rather than hurts, racial minorities,”250 suggested that
history counsels “greater humility,” 251 and likened the position the Univer-

244. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, Inc., 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
245. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349–50 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
246. Id. at 372 (“The Law School tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a University of Michigan degree and all of the opportunities that it offers. These overmatched students
take the bait, only to find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition. And this mismatch crisis is not restricted to elite institutions.”).
247. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“Disfavoring a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution, the dissent
would give school boards a free hand to make decisions on the basis of race—an approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).”); id. at 773–81 (equating dissent’s arguments to those which sustained Jim Crow laws);
id. at 777 (“The similarities between the dissent’s arguments and the segregationists’ arguments
do not stop there.”). Justice Thomas’s concession of Justice Breyer’s “good intentions” in a footnote at the end of his opinion does not mitigate the impact of the earlier statements. See id. at 782
n.30.
248. See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, A Return to Civility, 33 TULSA L.J. 7 (1997); Clarence
Thomas, Civility and Public Discourse, 31 N. ENG. L. REV. 515 (1997).
249. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 2429.
251. Id. (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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sity of Texas and Justice Ginsburg espoused to arguments of slave owners
and segregationists. 252
These expressions make clear that issues regarding race are not ones
Justice Thomas approaches in a detached manner. On the contrary, his discussions in his discretionary opinions regarding race are sometimes emotional as well as analytical. It is not surprising that the other justices almost
never join these opinions. They are written in a passionate and personal
voice from which others may learn but cannot easily join.
Justice Thomas’s 2007 memoir makes clear his intense interest in, and
strong views about, racial policy and provides possible insights into some
sources of some of the opinions he has expressed in these cases. 253 In the
preface, he said that writing the book forced him “to suffer old hurts, endure
old pains, and revisit old doubts” and that he was sometimes “surprised by
how fresh my feelings still were.” 254 Although the book did not specify
which hurts, pains, and doubts then remained fresh, it discussed the evolution of his thinking on some matters he has addressed on the Court. For instance, he recalls concluding while a student at Holy Cross in the 1960s that
preferential policies should be available only for poorer blacks and whites
rather than for middle-class blacks. 255 But he also did not believe government should increase the dependency of poorer blacks on government, a
condition he thought potentially “as diabolical as segregation.”256 In applying to Yale Law School, he asked it to consider him as “disadvantaged” and
assumed he received an admission preference based on poverty, not race.257
But he soon suffered from the perception that his race accounted for his
presence at the nation’s most elite law school, and he concluded that “the
stigmatizing effects of racial preference” would subsequently discount his
achievements. 258 He felt “tricked” and hurt by his purported benefactors
and was “even more bitter toward those ostensibly unprejudiced whites who
pretended to side with black people while using them to further their own
political and social ends” than towards white bigots.259 He was “humiliated” by his difficulty finding an appealing job, which he attributed to the fact
that race preference tainted his Yale degree.260
He strongly opposed efforts to use busing to integrate schools in the
1970s, preferring to focus on stopping officially supported segregation and
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id.
See generally THOMAS, supra note 4.
Id. at ix.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id. at 87.
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on promoting education and employment. 261 He thought blacks were victimized by social engineering theories.262 His work in the legislative and
executive branches confirmed his views regarding the fallacy of trying to
send blacks to predominantly white schools rather than focusing on their
education in their neighborhoods or at historically black institutions.263 He
feared that policies like urban renewal would have unintended consequences harmful to minorities. 264 He especially wanted to preserve historically
black colleges from disappearing “in the rush toward integration” and was
appalled by the indifference of government bureaucrats and civil rights
groups who cared only about the racial composition of white colleges rather
than educating black students.265
The personal recitals in Justice Thomas’s memoir connect to the passionate opinions he writes regarding constitutional issues dealing with race.
The sentiments expressed in Fordice regarding the value of historical black
colleges will not surprise anyone who has read similar observations in the
memoir. Similarly, Justice Thomas’s belief that race conscious decisionmaking stigmatized him and diminished his life’s accomplishments resembles arguments he made in Grutter and Fisher. 266
A final facet of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence in constitutional race
cases provides further reason to believe that his race jurisprudence traces to
something other than a consistent legal principle, originalist or otherwise.
Although Justice Thomas often states principles in race cases in a formalistic, rule-like manner that allows few, if any, exceptions (for example, colorblind Constitution, no classifications based on race, and so on), 267 he occasionally deviates from those assertions.

261. Id. at 78–79.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 141–43.
264. Id. at 147.
265. Id.
266. Professor Rossum rebuts Justice Thomas’s “critics” and, anticipatorily, an argument of
this article by claiming that Justice Thomas’s belief in a color-blind Constitution traces to “the
principle of equality in the Declaration of Independence that infuses and underlies the Constitution” not to his personal experiences. ROSSUM, supra note 98 at 213. Justice Thomas’s memoir
connects many of his views on issues relating to race to experiences which presumably predated
his development of this constitutional view. Moreover, the passionate tone of his opinions in constitutional cases dealing with race contrasts with that of his opinions in which he relies on various
forms of originalism.
267. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 752
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Therefore, as a general rule, all race-based government decisionmaking—regardless of context—is unconstitutional.”); id. at 756 (“[T]he programs are subject
to the general rule that government race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional.”); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J. concurring) (“I would hold that a State’s use of
racial discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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During his first term on the Court, he twice expressed views in a manner that suggested some race-conscious decisionmaking. In Georgia v.
McCollum, he criticized the Court’s extension of the Batson line of cases
regarding peremptory jury challenges, noting the impact on black defendants in criminal cases. In Fordice, he wrote a concurrence stating that the
Court’s opinion did not jeopardize historic black schools. To be sure, in
each instance, he expressed some racial neutrality. In McCollum, he opined
that the rule barring white criminal defendants from racially based peremptories would also apply to black defendants; 268 in Fordice, he acknowledged
that such historically black schools would need to use race neutral admissions policies. 269 But in McCollum he made clear his concern that white juries would be prejudiced against black defendants, 270 and he asserted in
Fordice that states could maintain diverse institutions including historically
black colleges with “established traditions and programs that might disproportionately appeal to one race or another.”271
Two years after embracing a near bright-line constitutional principle
against racial classifications in Grutter and Gratz and two years before doing so in Parents Involved, Justice Thomas concluded that strict scrutiny
did not apply when California prison officials separated inmates based on
race. In Johnson v. California, 272 he criticized the majority for “decid[ing]
this case without addressing the problems that racial violence poses for
wardens, guards, and inmates throughout the federal and state prison systems.” 273 Justice Thomas observed that “[t]he Constitution has always demanded less within the prison walls” and called for deference to “reasonable judgments of officials experienced in running this Nation’s prisons.” 274
He concluded that California’s policy of race-conscious assignments was
“reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest,”275 the test he applied from the Court’s precedent in Turner v. Safley.276 Significantly, Justice Thomas did not conclude that the strict scrutiny standard was met but
rather that it did not apply in this context.277 He also never bothered to con268. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 62 & n.2 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
269. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 749 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
270. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 61 (Thomas J., concurring).
271. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 748–49 (Thomas, J., concurring).
272. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
273. Id. at 532 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 524.
275. Id. at 534.
276. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
277. But cf. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 547 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (raising the possibility that California’s policy would pass strict scrutiny depending on whether it was narrowly tailored). In
Grutter, Justice Thomas had traced strict scrutiny to Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), rather than to McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), and applied its “pressing public necessity” test narrowly to exclude a range of important state interests and to allow government
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sider whether Turner correctly reflected the original meaning of the Constitution. Instead, Justice Thomas repeatedly invoked Turner and other precedents to argue that “constitutional demands are diminished in the unique
context of prisons” so that the Court’s strict scrutiny jurisprudence does not
apply to racial classifications there.278
In these opinions, Justice Thomas deviated from his usual conclusion
that the Constitution forbids all race classifications and requires color-blind
decisionmaking to recognize the validity of some race conscious official
behavior. In McCollum, the perils to black defendants prompted his comment. In Fordice, the historic role and continuing value of black institutions of higher education invited his discussion. In Johnson, the reality of
racial violence in prisons prompted his approach. 279 These cases suggest
that notwithstanding Justice Thomas’s tendency to assert sweeping brightline, neutral-sounding rules regarding constitutional meaning in race cases,
in applying his jurisprudence these propositions sometimes yield to other
considerations. In fact, he seems most likely to invoke this formalistic reasoning to strike down race-conscious governmental action that he believes
may stigmatize African-Americans. When he does not perceive that risk,
he is sometimes willing to allow some race-conscious decisionmaking in
order to pursue racial justice (for example, in McCollum and Fordice) or
other important ends (for example, in Johnson).
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Thomas’s commitment to originalism should lead the Court’s
most consistent originalist to use that approach in constitutional cases dealing with race. Yet for more than two decades Justice Thomas has abandoned that methodology in race cases even though he has often written discretionary opinions where he was free to apply his preferred approach.
Fisher recently presented yet another occasion when, consistent with his
longstanding practice, Justice Thomas ignored the opportunity to apply
originalism to race-conscious decisionmaking. Although he occasionally
includes a reference to the Declaration of Independence, he has for more
to classify based on race only to provide “a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence.”
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Many believe Korematsu actually applied a much more deferential standard than strict scrutiny, one closer to the standard Justice Thomas would have applied in Johnson. See generally,
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1277 (2007).
278. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 541 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 544 (“The majority
cannot fall back on the Constitution’s usual demands, because those demands have always been
lessened inside the prison walls.”).
279. See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680–84 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (defending school voucher programs to help black children and other minorities in lengthy
consequentialist argument).
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than two decades made no effort in his opinions to connect the conclusions
that the Constitution is color-blind and allows no racial classifications to
any discussion of originalism. Although he makes elaborate use of dictionaries and Framers’ debates and contemporary practice in so many of his
opinions interpreting other constitutional clauses, those originalist tools are
absent when he addresses constitutional questions dealing with race. Instead, he uses moral and consequential arguments to support his conclusions in these cases, often in very passionate and personal terms.
Justice Thomas’s judicial behavior in this respect should be a source of
some concern to originalists. For what does it say about a theory if its most
prominent proponent persistently abandons it without explanation in cases
that are clearly important to him and to the nation?
This phenomenon also raises questions about Justice Thomas’s performance based on the criteria he has set for himself. Justice Thomas has
repeatedly described himself as an originalist and has disparaged other
methodologies. Justice Thomas’s writings, on and off the Court, suggest
that cases dealing with race and affirmative action are among those that
most engage him, intellectually and emotionally. Yet he has not used his
endorsed methodology in addressing these cases nor has he provided any
explanation for his failure to do so. At worst, he has reached results in high
profile race cases contrary to originalism. At best, he has not provided an
elaborated originalist rationale for his conclusions despite repeated opportunity to do so.
Moreover, he has consistently failed to address extensive originalist
arguments that contradict his conclusion. Although he cited Professor
McConnell’s article when it was just off the press, he has never bothered to
discuss the work that argued that originalism leads to different results than
those he has reached.
Yet Justice Thomas’s work in race cases is unique. In cases that do
not ostensibly deal with race, he has brought racial history or impacts into
the discussion. In cases dealing with race, his opinions are impassioned and
quite different from those of the other justices, even those who arrive at
similar conclusions. They could not, or would not, have been written by
Justice Scalia or by any of the other conservative justices. Others rarely
even join Justice Thomas’s opinions in race cases. His voice is personal
and unique.
This presents an irony regarding Justice Thomas’s stated aspirations to
function as an impartial justice. What is distinctive about his opinions in
race cases is neither their consistency with originalism nor their impartiality. Rather, their distinctive and powerful component resides in the unique
perspectives Justice Thomas offers based on his experiences and observations. These perspectives, not originalist analysis, are what he has contributed to our jurisprudence on race. Far from the impartial umpire he asserts
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a justice should be, in race cases his experiences and passion regarding the
subject seem to influence his consideration of constitutional questions.
Elsewhere, Justice Thomas may apply insights from originalism to resolve constitutional disputes. In race cases, however, he does not call them
as the Framers or ratifiers or original generation saw them. Nor does he appear to search for guidance in these cases from these sources regarding how
he should see them.
Instead, in constitutional cases dealing with race, he calls them as he
sees them.
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